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Résumé/abstract  
 
This paper analyzes how different combinations of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) dimensions 
affect corporate economic performance. We use various dimensions of CSR to examine whether firms 
rely on different combinations of CSR, in terms of quality versus quantity of CSR practices. Our 
empirical analysis based on an original database including 10,293 French firms shows that different 
CSR dimensions in isolation impact positively firms’ profits but their effect in term on intensity varies 
among CSR dimensions. Moreover, the findings on the qualitative CSR measure, based on interaction 
between its dimensions, show that the substitutability of these dimensions is highly significant for firm 
performance. However, in terms of the intensity, those interactions produce differential effects. 
 
Mots-clés/Key words: corporate social responsibility, firm performance, substitutability, 
complementarity, trade-off, simultaneous equations models. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In all OECD countries, firms are making a lot of effort to be, or at least to appear, socially 
responsible. In 2005, for instance, 52% of the top 100 corporations in the 16 most 
industrialized countries published reports on their corporate and socially responsible 
activities. In fact, since the late 1990s, many industrialized countries have adopted laws 
requiring firms (listed and/or non listed) to publish reports detailing their exposure to 
environmental, social and governance risks and how they address these risks.1 
Nevertheless, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) means socially and environmentally 
friendly actions not only required by law, but going beyond compliance, privately providing 
public goods or voluntarily internalizing externalities. According to the European 
Commission (2007), being socially responsible in fact means that, beyond legal requirements, 
firms accept to bear the cost of more ethical behavior by voluntarily committing, for instance, 
to improving employment conditions, banning child labor and not working with countries that 
do not respect human rights, protecting the environment and investing in equipment to reduce 
their carbon footprint, developing partnerships with NGOs, providing funds to charity, etc. 
CSR strategies would in fact allow firms to maximize value and to minimize risk in the long 
run, to respond to increased competitive pressure and market differentiation, and such 
strategies would more generally take into account the growing demands of their stakeholders 
(customers, consumers, employees, investors). But do firms actually benefit from CSR 
strategies? Can it be profitable to invest in responsible practices beyond legal obligations? In 
                                                 
1Laws “New economic regulation” (2001) and “Grenelle II” (2010) in France, “Sarbanes-Oxley” (2002) and 
Greenhouse gas reporting rule (2010) in the US, “Social responsibility for large businesses” (2008) in Denmark, 
“Sustainability reporting” (2013) in Norway, “Companies Act” (2006) and “Carbon reduction commitment” 
(2010)  in the UK, “Sustainable economy” (2011) in Spain etc. 
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other words, what are the links between CSR and corporate economic performance? In turn, 
what is the value of CSR strategies, in particular with respect to social, environmental or 
market behavior?  
The impact of Corporate Social Responsibility on corporate economic performance has 
received considerable attention in the literature over the past three decades (see e.g. Margolis 
et al., 2009 for comprehensive reviews). However, even if several studies using meta-analyses 
(Margolis et al., 2009; Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky et al., 2003) conclude that the 
relationship between CSR and firms is non-negative, there is no unanimity so far. Social 
responsibility rather seems to have an ambiguous and complex impact on firm performance 
though no true causality has been proved yet. While some research argues that investment in 
social responsibility raises a firm’s costs, which makes it less competitive (Friedman, 1970; 
Brummer, 1991; McWilliams and Siegel, 1997), other research has suggested that by 
investing in social performance, a firm can achieve competitive advantage by attracting 
resources and quality employees more easily, differentiating its products and services, 
reducing its exposure to risk, etc. (Cochran and Wood, 1984; Turban and Greening, 1996; 
Waddock and Graves, 1997; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; Godfrey, 2004).  
 
According to Cavaco and Crifo (2013) one reason for this absence of consensus lies in the 
possibility of a quantity-quality trade-off between the various dimensions of corporate 
responsibility, where quantity refers to the effect of the CSR dimensions in isolation and taken 
together and quality corresponds to interactions between various CSR dimensions. A firm’s 
CSR policy is multi-dimensional and includes environmental, social and business behavior 
factors. Consequently, using a single item as a proxy for generic CSR could cause 
fundamental uncertainty about the relationship between CSR and firm performance (e.g. 
Surroca, Tribò and Waddock, 2010). In this sense, Mackey, Mackey and Barney (2007), 
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Brammer and Milligton (2008) and Barcos et al. (2013) suggest that some forms of socially 
responsible behavior are positively associated with firm performance while other are not. 
Barnett and Solomon (2006) show that CSR investments vary by the intensity of a firm’s 
social screening and also in the types of social screens that a firm employs. Hence, there is a 
need to break down the CSR among the different dimensions in order to study its possible 
differential impact on a firm performance (Barcos et al., 2013). Moreover, how those various 
dimensions interact as inputs of firm performance is important. In a context of limited 
resources, firms may well face a quantity (specific practices or number of practices employed) 
or quality (interactions among practices employed) trade-off effect, suggesting a complex and 
ambiguous impact of various CSR combinations on business performance. Thus, we test 
whether such a quantity-quality trade-off emerges using data on French firms from the 
Organizational Change and Computerization survey (COI, 2006).  
To measure CSR, existing studies often focus on CSR scores or ratings provided by extra-
financial rating agencies like KLD in the US or Vigeo in Europe. This study uses secondary 
data on CSR performance. “Secondary data is useful not only to find the information to solve 
our research problem, but also better understand and explain our research problem” (Ghauri 
and Gronhaug, 2005). Actually, the interest of the COI survey is that it provides quantitative 
metrics of CSR related management practices rather than extra-financial evaluation. As 
emphasized by Chatterji, Levine and Toffel (2009), extra-financial ratings are rarely evaluated 
and have been criticized for their own lack of transparency. Therefore, our measures of CSR 
related management practices offer a different but complementary approach to such social and 
environmental ratings as they rely on actual practices implemented by the firms, rather than 
evaluations (scores or ratings) based on past and/or expected future CSR behaviors. The 
limitation of our variables is that we do not cover CSR management practices related to 
human rights, community involvement or corporate governance. In this sense, our research is 
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more focused on stakeholder oriented CSR practices, notably towards employees, or 
customers and suppliers (Barcos et al., 2013. Yet, our database relies on a representative 
sample of more than 10,000 French firms, whereas extra-financial agencies cover only several 
hundred (multinational) firms. 
 Our results indicate that CSR management related practices in isolation impact positively on 
corporate performance measured by a firm’s profit, while an aggregate CSR indicator 
(measuring a purely quantitative strategy) is positively associated with firm profit only when 
having at least two dimensions. Moreover, the qualitative CSR measure based on interaction 
among its dimensions shows that the substitutability of these dimensions is highly significant 
for firm performance. It is worth noting that different isolation forms and interactions of CSR 
dimensions produce different effects on firm performance in terms of intensity. 
We believe that these results contribute to the CSR literature in several ways. First, rather than 
simply investigating the impact of one CSR dimension on firm performance, we analyze how 
different combinations of CSR dimensions affect firm performance measured by profit. 
Second, we use data on a representative sample of French firms, which permits us to construct 
two types of variables from the aforementioned questions. Additionally, employing this data 
allows us to control for a very detailed set of firm characteristics and features in order to 
properly isolate the effect on firm performance of the quantity-quality trade-off between CSR 
dimensions, to address the reverse-causality issues and to properly correct for the endogeneity 
of CSR variables. Finally, using a French database is appealing since empirical studies on 
CSR and firm business performance refer mainly to experience in US firms. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the core of our analysis while section 3 
builds testable hypotheses. Section 4 presents the data and method. Section 5 presents our 
empirical results and discusses the findings, and section 6 concludes the paper. 
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HYPOTHESES 
 
It is becoming conventional wisdom today to define corporate social responsibility through 
the lenses of three main dimensions: environmental, social and governance (the so-called ESG 
factors). In turn, and drawing on previous research (e.g. Waddock and Graves, 1997; Cavaco 
and Crifo, 2013; Barcos et al., 2013), we define CSR relying on three main categories: 
environmental performance, human resource related practices, and relationships with 
customers & suppliers.  
 
Isolated and Aggregated Effect of CSR Dimensions on Firm Performance 
Previous studies underline the differential effects of CSR dimensions on firm performance 
(e.g. Brammer and Pavelin, 2006; Barcos et al., 2013). Therefore, it is likely that the impact 
of CSR on firm performance is contingent upon which dimension of social responsiveness is 
taken into consideration. Furthermore, the issue of whether each of our three dimensions of 
CSR (environmental performance, human resources performance, and relationships with 
customers & suppliers) is related to firm performance is far from resolved. For instance, 
several studies find a positive relationship between environmental practices or performance 
and economic performance (see e.g. Delmas and Pekovic, 2013; Lo et al., 2012), but other 
results appear to be negative or non-significant (Barla, 2007; Filbeck and Gorman, 2004). The 
same types of results may be found for human resource measures. Improving human resource 
practices may appear to affect performance positively (Huselid, 1994) or negatively 
(Gimenez, Sierra and Rodon, 2012). For the customer & supplier dimension, many scholars 
note its importance for firms and an increasing number of recent studies are now examining 
whether investment in customer and supplier policies makes business sense. Results appear 
mixed as well (Zhu and Nakata, 2007; Yeng, 2008; Lin et al., 2005; Reitzig and Wagner, 
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2010). For instance, Yeung (2008) concludes that strategic supply management leads to 
improved on-time shipments and reduced operational costs, and leads to customer satisfaction 
and improved business performance. On the other side, investment in better relations with 
suppliers may create for a firm the opportunity costs of non-learning, which could negatively 
affect its performance (Reitzig and Wagner, 2010). Inherently a multi-dimension construct, 
there is no reason to believe that one dimension (say the customer & supplier  dimension) 
affects firm performance in the same direction as another one (say environmental). In fact, 
different costs and revenues characterize management practices, affecting firm performance 
differently.  
Thus, the first step in order to understand better the relationship between CSR and firm 
performance is to open the black box by examining how CSR dimensions in isolation and in 
aggregation influence firm performance. Although the literature argues that the relationship 
between different dimensions of CSR and firm performance is not straightforward, extensive 
research conducted over the past 30 years is in line with studies that tend to show a positive 
relationship, or at least not a negative one, between CSR dimensions and financial 
performance (Margolis et al., 2009; Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky et al., 2003). 
Therefore we formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1A: Isolated CSR dimensions exert a positive impact on firm performance. 
 
Even if creating an aggregated measure of CSR hides the individual effects of each CSR 
dimension, using an aggregated construct of CSR may facilitate inter-firm comparison on the 
level of CSR established inside firms. However, previous research using aggregated CSR 
constructs presents inconsistency in findings concerning the relationship between CSR and 
firm performance (e.g. Waddock and Graves, 1997; Surroca et al., 2010). Moreover, given the 
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importance of each dimension of CSR for firm performance, we expect that overall the firm’s 
tendency to demonstrate its social responsibility is positively associated with the firm’s 
performance, and propose the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1B: Aggregate measure of CSR exerts a positive impact on firm performance. 
 
The Complementarity or Substitutability Effect of CSR Dimensions 
The contradictory results or the absence of consensus concerning the relationship between 
CSR and firm performance may be explained by the role of interactions among the various 
components of CSR. Taking into account the interaction among various CSR dimensions 
reveals that complex mechanisms are at work in terms of responsible management practices, 
with combinations exhibiting both complementarity and substitutability (see Cavaco and 
Crifo, 2013). It is important to point out that the definitions of complementarity and 
substitutability that we use are borrowed from Athey and Stern (1998), and they are actually 
close to the notions of supermodularity and submodularity in game theory. The definitions of 
complementarity and substitutability by Athey and Stern (1998) might seem counterintuitive 
with respect to conventional wisdom (at least concerning complementarity between goods) 
which associates complementarity with positive correlation and substitutability with negative 
correlation. Following Athey and Stern (1998), two CSR practices can both be positively 
correlated and substitutable. More precisely, having more than one CSR practice creates a 
complementary effect if the magnitude of the performance effect of these management 
practices altogether is strictly larger than the sum of the marginal effects from adopting only 
one practice (Ichniowski et al., 1997). In this sense, complementarity indicates that firms are 
likely to combine a set of practices since the benefits of such a complete pattern of practices 
are superior to the sum of the individual benefits (Whittington et al., 1999). A reason could be 
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the existence of a synergistic effect of bundling practices together. What type of CSR 
practices can we expect to be complementary ? The Stakeholder theory of the firm argues that 
managing relationships between primary stakeholders (suppliers of capital, labor and other 
resources, customers and suppliers) can result in much more than just their continued 
participation in the firm, and yield long term competitive advantage (Hillman and Keim, 
2001). Hence, we may expect complementarities between CSR related management practices 
towards primary stakeholders like employees, customers and suppliers.  
A substitutability effect between CSR practices means exactly the opposite here. One can 
explain substitutability by the fact that although CSR dimensions have the same final 
objective, individually they act differently. For instance, one firm can have great relations 
with its customers but also has a reputation for polluting the environment. The good relations 
with customers could not compensate for the environmental degradation. In this sense, Berens 
et al. (2007), examining the effect on product preferences, find that a poor corporate ability 
could not be compensated by good CSR. Moreover, based on decision-making theory, it is 
argued that in forming a general evaluation, negative attributes tend to outweigh positive 
attributes (e.g. Baumeister et al., 2001). Thus, we may argue that existing CSR dimensions 
inside a firm cannot compensate for missing CSR dimensions. Additionally, according to 
decision-making theory (see the so-called Choquet integral, Grabisch 1997), when two 
dimensions share some similar “substantial” attributes, then the interaction between these 
dimensions leads to substitutability. For instance, green and customer & supplier dimensions 
share some similar “substantial” attributes in the sense that it is difficult to implement a green 
dimension within a firm without implementing some attributes of the customer & supplier 
dimension (Lehtonen, 2004; OCDE, 20062). Indeed, environmental practices have become 
critical to a firm’s relationships with different stakeholder groups such as customers and 
                                                 
2http://www.oecd.org/environment/36958774.pdf 
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suppliers (Barnett and Salomon, 2006; Grolleau, Mzoughi and Pekovic, 2007). As a 
consequence, when implementing both dimensions, the effect on the firm’s performance will 
be equal to the sum of the effect of the green dimension and the effect of the attributes of the 
customer & supplier dimension that are not shared by the green dimension. On the contrary, if 
two dimensions do not share similar “substantial” attributes, then the interaction between 
these dimensions leads to complementarity or additivity. Finally we can use also the 
stakeholder theory of the firm in order to predict the complementarity or substitutability of 
our three CSR dimensions. According to this theory, using corporate resources to pursue 
issues that are not directly related to the relationship with primary stakeholders may not lead 
to sustained competitive advantage (Hillman and Keim, 2001). Here, this would mean that 
there should exist some trade-offs (substitutability) between primary and non-primary 
stakeholders (Cavaco and Crifo, 2013), that is between CSR practices towards employees, and 
customers and suppliers on the one hand; and towards the environment on the other hand. In 
fact, though the environment may be quoted as a stakeholder, it is often difficult to identify a 
direct spokesperson and therefore to embed it into the firm’s primary stakeholder category. 
To conclude we expect a complementarity effect between human resources and customer & 
supplier dimensions3; and substitutability effects between green and human resources 
dimensions; green and customer & supplier dimensions. 
We formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The interaction among different CSR dimensions generates: 
                                                 
3Even though one could argue that a firm’s customer and supplier orientation strategy is based on some social 
attributes, we consider that they are not strong enough to produce the substitutability effect between social and 
customer & supplier dimensions. For instance, as argued by Ferrell (2004), in a highly competitive market, a 
firm could both have anti-social behavior and be strongly customer oriented. 
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♦substitutability effects between green and HR; green and customer & supplier; green, HR, 
customer & supplier; 
♦complementarity effects between HR and customer & supplier. 
 
DATA AND METHOD  
 
Data 
The data is extracted from the French Organizational Changes and Computerization (COI) 
2006 survey.4The COI survey is a matched employer-employee dataset on organizational 
change and computerization. Researchers and statisticians from the National Institute for 
Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE), the Ministry of Labor, and the Center for Labor 
Studies (CEE) created this survey. The survey contains about 13,790 private sector firms with 
at least 10 employees each. It is a representative population of French firms from all business 
sectors except agriculture, forestry and fishing. Each firm filled in a self-administered 
questionnaire concerning the utilization of information technologies and work organizational 
practices in 2006, and changes that had occurred in those areas since 2003. Firms were also 
interviewed on the economic goals driving the decision to implement organizational changes 
and the economic context in which those decisions were made.  
In order to obtain information on export volumes and profitability, the COI survey was 
merged with another database called the Annual Business Survey (EAE, 2003 and 2006).5 We 
use two editions of the EAE survey from 2003 (to obtain information on exports volumes and 
                                                 
4More details about the design and scope of this survey are available on www.enquetecoi.net: Survey COI-TIC 
2006-INSEE-CEE/Treatments CEE. 
5More details about the design and scope of this survey are available on 
http://www.insee.fr/en/methodes/default.asp?page=definitions/enquete-annuelle-entreprises.htm 
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sales) and from 2006 (to obtain information on profit).  As a result, our sample includes 
10,293 firms. 
 
Dependent and Main Independent Variables 
We use as dependent variable firm’s profit per employee. Existing studies often rely on 
accounting measures of financial performance (e.g. return on asset, return on equity, return on 
capital employed, return on sales) or market-based measures of financial performance (e.g. 
Tobin’s q), mainly because of data availability. Nevertheless, a few papers rely on firm 
profitability indicators. For instance, Brammer and Pavelin (2006) use the ratio of pre-tax 
profits to total assets and Fernandez-Kranz and Santalo (2010) use average profits (in dollars) 
to control for firm profitability in their empirical estimations.  
Our analysis provides a different but complementary approach to papers focusing on 
accounting or market measures. In fact, accounting measures are backward looking and 
capture past financial performance, but are subject to bias from managerial manipulation and 
differences in accounting procedures. Market measures are forward looking and are less 
dependent on accounting procedures but only represent the investor's evaluation of the ability 
of a firm to generate future economic earnings. Basically, profitability indicators (like profit 
margins or ratio) are usually considered as reflecting productivity whereas economic 
profitability would be captured by accounting measures, and market value would be captured 
by market-based measures.  
Concerning the main independent variables, the COI survey allows reliance on direct 
indicators of CSR related management practices grouped under three dimensions. More 
precisely, like Barcos et al. (2013) we use three CSR dimensions: green practices, human 
resources practices, and business behavior towards customers and suppliers. This approach is 
consistent with existing studies, which measure CSR with extra-financial ratings either 
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through scores (e.g. continuous variable over the 0-100 interval) or through relative rankings, 
represented by a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 (respectively 0) if the firm is ranked 
above (respectively below) the sectoral average on the corresponding CSR dimension (see 
Cavaco and Crifo, 2013). 
Our approach offers a perspective on CSR related management practices different to studies 
based on extra-financial scores or ratings provided by agencies such as KLD in the US or 
Vigeo in Europe. As emphasized in Chatterji, Levine and Toffel (2009), extra-financial rating 
examines firms’ environmental and social management activities and past performance, as 
well as future outlook. Such ratings aim to provide socially responsible investors with 
accurate information that makes transparent the extent to which firms’ behaviors are socially 
responsible. They usually rely on a variety of areas of corporate social responsibility. For 
instance, the European extra-financial agency Vigeo produces scores and ratings relying on 
six CSR dimensions: environment, human rights, human resources, governance, business 
behaviors towards customers and suppliers, and societal commitment towards local 
communities. Similarly, the American extra-financial agency KLD produces “strengths” and 
“concerns” relying on seven CSR dimensions: community, corporate governance, diversity, 
employee relations, environment, human rights, and product and business behaviors. For each 
dimension, there is a subset of criteria describing how the firm manages a particular aspect of 
the CSR dimension. However, several studies have criticized the measures used in the KLD 
database (e.g. Chen and Delmas, 2011). 
Here, our variables may seem less complete than those based on extra-financial scores. Our 
approach does not include the human rights, governance and societal commitment dimensions 
simply because we do not have such information in our database. We are mainly oriented 
towards stakeholder associated CSR practices (Barcos et al., 2013). Furthermore, the 
advantages of the COI survey are to allow 1) the measuring of CSR directly through a CSR 
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performance measure, 2) a CSR performance measure for 10,293 firms which are 
representative of French firms. As a consequence, we expect more precise estimates.  
Note in addition that our four CSR related dimensions give a precise content to the 
conventional definition of CSR by the European Commission as “a concept whereby 
companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in 
their interaction with their stakeholders by voluntarily taking on commitments which go 
beyond common regulatory and conventional requirements” (European Commission 2001). 
We have matched the COI survey with the Vigeo dataset and it appears that 21 firms are in 
both datasets. Within these 21 firms, we checked for the link between our CSR construction 
and the Vigeo ratings. We found that our CSR construction includes a part of the information 
conveyed by the Vigeo ratings. 
Our CSR related dimensions are defined as follows. 
Green. We use in the survey the variable denoted Green, which is a binary variable, coded 1 
if the firm was registered according to one of the following standards i.e., ISO 14001 
standard, organic labeling, fair trade, etc., in 2003.  
Human Resources (HR). We construct a human resources indicator which presents the sum of 
the following six components: (1) it is very important or important for the firm to improve 
employee relations/ skills and keep its employees; (2) the firm had central databases for 
human resources, training in 2003; (3) the firm had had internal and (4) external departments 
focused on human resources, training since 2003; (5) the firm used the internet for employees' 
learning or training in 2003. Moreover, in order to test our hypothesis concerning the 
complementarity and trade-off effects between CSR dimensions, we must harmonize the 
values of each CSR dimension. We solve this problem by converting the HR dimension into a 
binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the HR component is equal or superior to 2.11 (the 
mean of the sum of the previously mentioned components). 
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Customer & Supplier. We construct a customer & supplier indicator as the sum of eleven 
following items: (1) the firm used labeling tools for goods and services in 2003; (2) the firm 
was engaged in the delivery or supply of goods or services to a fixed deadline in 2003; (3) the 
firm had a contact or call center for customers in 2003; (4) the firm had adopted integrated IT-
CRM in 2003; (5) the main customer demanded that the firm comply with a quality standard 
or quality control procedure in 2003; (6) the firm used tools to study customer expectations, 
behavior or satisfaction in 2003; (7) the firm had had internal departments focused on 
improving safety and environmental issues since 2003; (8) the firm had signed contracts or 
was engaged with some suppliers in long term relationships in 2003; (9) on the firm’s 
demand, the main supplier complied with a quality standard or quality control procedure in 
2003; (10) the main supplier had an IT system (for orders, invoices, etc.) linked to that of the 
firm’s in 2003; (11) the firm was registered according to the ISO 9000 standard (quality 
management).  
For the Customer & Supplier dimension, we calculate the mean of the sum of these eleven 
components and create a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the customer and supplier 
component is equal or superior to 4.03 (the mean value of the sum). 
 
From these three binary CSR dimensions, we constructed two types of variables: 
CSR. In order to test the effect of aggregate measure of Corporate Social Responsibility on 
firm performance we create the variable CSR, which sums up the three (binary) dimensions: 
(1) green; (2) HR; (3) customer & supplier. From this CSR variable which varies from 0 to 3, 
we create three binary variables:  
• CSR_1_0 = 1 if the firm had invested in only one CSR dimension; and = 0 if the firm 
had not invested in any CSR dimensions;  
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• CSR_2_0 = 1 if the firm had invested in two CSR dimensions; and = 0 if the firm had 
not invested in any CSR dimensions;  
• CSR_3_0 = 1 if the firm had invested in three CSR dimensions; and = 0 if the firm had 
not invested in any CSR dimensions;  
 
Interaction. To investigate the effect of complementarity and synergies between CSR 
dimensions, we create seven variables, namely:  
• Interaction1_0 = 1 if the firm had invested only in green practices; and = 0 if the firm 
had not invested in any CSR dimensions; 
• Interaction2_0 = 1 if the firm had invested only in HR practices; and = 0 if the firm 
had not invested in any CSR dimensions; 
• Interaction3_0 = 1 if the firm had invested only in customer & supplier dimensions; 
and = 0 if the firm had not invested in any CSR dimensions; 
• Interaction4_0 = 1 if the firm had invested in both green and HR dimensions; and = 0 
if the firm had not invested in any CSR dimensions; 
• Interaction5_0 = 1 if the firm had invested in both green and customer & supplier 
dimensions; and = 0 if the firm had not invested in any CSR dimensions; 
• Interaction6_0 = 1 if the firm had invested in both HR and customer & supplier 
dimensions; and = 0 if the firm had not invested in any CSR dimensions; 
• Interaction7_0 = 1 if the firm had invested in all practices; and = 0 if the firm did had 
not invested in any CSR dimensions. 
 
Controls 
In order to control for firm-level heterogeneity, our analysis includes variables representing 
firm characteristics and features based on previous studies, specifically those relating to 
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Corporate Social Responsibility and firm performance (e.g. Capon et al., 1990; Waddock and 
Graves, 1997; Russo and Fouts, 1997; McWilliams and Siegel, 2000; Brammer and Milligton, 
2008).  
Size. In general, a positive relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility and size is 
found (e.g. Waddock and Graves, 1997; McWilliams and Siegel, 2000; Brammer and 
Milligton, 2008). Substantial research has also demonstrated that firm size significantly 
influences firm performance (e.g. Waddock and Graves, 1997), although the direction of its 
effect is not consistent (Russo and Fouts, 1997). So we introduce firm size, which is measured 
by a continuous variable representing the number of employees within the firm. 
Holding. Being part of a holding company could play a considerable role in a firm’s decision 
to invest in Corporate Social Responsibility since those firms might have more financial 
resources available to them for investment in new practices (Pekovic, 2010). Concerning the 
relation between holding and firm performance, it is argued that being part of a holding 
company could improve firm performance through economies of scope (Delmas and Pekovic, 
2013). Hence, we include a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when the firm belonged to 
a holding company in 2003. 
Market Uncertainty. A firm that is socially responsible may be able to increase interpersonal 
trust between and among internal and external stakeholders, build social capital, lower 
transaction costs, and, therefore ultimately reduce uncertainty (Orlitzky and Benjamin, 2001).  
Miller and Bromiley (1990) argue that uncertainty negatively influences firm performance. 
Therefore, we include a binary variable representing whether the firm had been affected 
strongly or very strongly by market uncertainty since 2003.  
Market Conditions.  Market expansion is expected to have positive influence on a firm’s 
probability of investing in Corporate Social Responsibility practices (Russo and Fouts, 1997). 
Drawing on Capon, Farley and Hoenig (1990), we may suppose that market growth positively 
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influences firm performance. In order to control for market conditions effects we use three 
binary variables indicating different market conditions since 2003: down market, steady 
market and growing market. 
Export. Previous empirical studies have confirmed that export activities positively influence a 
firm’s probability of investing in Corporate Social Responsibility practices (Grolleau et al., 
2007; Delmas and Montiel, 2009; Pekovic, 2010). Export activities lead to firm performance 
improvements that have been identified as “learning by exporting” (Bernard et al., 2003). We 
use a continuous variable representing the firm’s volume of exports divided by the firm’s 
sales in 2003. 
R&D. McWilliams and Siegel (2000) argue that R&D and CSR are positively correlated, 
since many aspects of CSR create either product innovation or process innovation, or both. A 
large amount of literature links investment in R&D to improvements in long-term economic 
performance (Griliches, 1979; Capon et al., 1990). In this study, R&D is based on two 
variables that indicate if a firm collaborated on its R&D activities in 2003 with private firms 
or laboratories, or with universities, the national center for research (CNRS), other public 
research organizations. 
Advertising Intensity. A firm’s CSR orientation might not be evident to the buyer directly, so 
advertising plays an important role in raising the awareness of those individuals who are 
interested in buying goods with CSR attributes (McWilliams and Siegel, 2000, 2001; 
Brammer and Pavelin, 2006;  Brammer and Milligton, 2008). Capon et al. (1990), Russo and 
Fouts (1997) and McWilliams and Siegel (2000) consider advertising intensity as an 
important determinant of firm performance. To control for this effect, we create a variable 
denoted Advertising Intensity, which is based on two variables that indicate whether the firm 
has in 2003 a tracking or reporting system running at least quarterly to follow financial 
profitability or to plan activities. 
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Business sector. The characteristics of a firm’s business sector have been considered a key 
influence on its corporate social orientation (e.g. McWilliams and Siegel, 2000). The 
inclusion of the firm’s sector is essential since it has been shown to explain variations in firm 
performance across industries, such as economies of scale and competitive intensity 
(McWilliams and Siegel, 2000). In order to control for sector differences, we include nine 
sector dummy variables based on the N36 sector classification created by the French National 
Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies: agri-foods; consumption goods; equipment 
goods; intermediate goods and energy; construction; sales; transport; financial and real-estate 
activities; and services to firms.  
The variables used in the estimation, their definitions and sample statistics are presented in 
Table 1.  
Table 1: Definition of variables and sample statistics 
 
Variable Description Mean SD Min Max 
 
CSR related practices 
 
Green Registered for ISO 
14001, organic labeling 
or fair trade in 2003 
0.11 0.32 0 1 
Human 
resources 
The firm invested in HR 
practices in 2003 0.36 0.48  
0 1 
Customer & 
Supplier 
The firm invested in 
customer and supplier  
practices in 2003 
0.42  0.49 0 1 
 
 
 
CSR 
The firm invested in 2003 in:  
 
all three practices; 0.07 0.24 0 1 
two practices;  0.21 0.41 0 1 
one practice; 0.28 0.45 0 1 
neither of the three 
practices 
0.44 0.49 0 1 
 
 
 
 
The firm invested in 2003 in: 
neither of the three CSR 
practices;  
0.44 0.49 0 1 
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Intersection 
green practices only;  0.01 0.12 0 1 
HR practices only;  
 
0.11 0.32 0 1 
customer & supplier 
practices only; 
0.15 0.36 0 1 
both green and HR 
practices; 
0.01 0.08 0 1 
both green and customer 
& supplier practices;  
0.03 0.17 0 1 
both HR and customer & 
supplier practices; 
0.18 0.38 0 1 
all three dimensions  0.07 0.24 0 1 
Profit Logarithm of profit per 
employee in 2006 
1.08 1.57 -8.14 8.67 
Instrumental variables 
Public 
regulation 
The firm’s business has 
been affected since 2003 
by a change in 
regulations, standards 
(health, environment, 
worker rights, etc.) 
0.52 0.5 0 1 
Workgroup 
Tools 
The firm’s uses in 2003 
some workgroup tools 
(e.g. groupware, 
videoconference, etc.) 
0.18 0.4 0 1 
Control variables 
 
Size Number of employees 360.55 2819.5
3 
10 11195
6 
Holding Belong to a holding group 
in 2003 
0.51 0.5 0 1 
Market 
Uncertainty 
The firm has been 
affected strongly or very 
strongly by market 
uncertainty since 2003 
0.6 0.5 0 1 
Market 
Condition 
How the market of the main activity of the firm has evolved since 
2003: 
Down  0.24 0.43 0 1 
Steady 0.53 0.50 0 1 
Growing  0.23 0.42 0 1 
Export Share of firm exportation 
by sales in 2003 
0.08 0.19 0 1 
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R&D Related to its R&D 
activities in 2003, the 
firm collaborated with (1) 
private firms or 
laboratories, (2) 
universities, national 
center for research (Cnrs), 
other research public 
organizations.  
0.2 0.4 0 1 
Advertising The firm has in 2003 a 
tracking or reporting 
system running at least 
quarterly to follow 
financial profitability or 
to plan activities. 
0.78 0.41 0 1 
Business 
sectors (a) 
Agrifood, consumption 
goods, cars and 
equipment, intermediate 
goods and energy, 
construction, Sales, 
transport, financial and 
real-estate activities, 
business services and 
individual services. 
        
 a: Because of the table’s length we do not report sample statistics for these variables. 
No problem of high correlation between the variables was detected. 
Because of the table’s length we do not report Pearson correlation coefficients for these variables;  
the results are available from the author upon request. 
 
Estimation Strategy 
 
We can compare the results of our regressions because they have all the same reference, 
which is the case where no CSR dimension is implemented. 
We run two kinds of estimates.  
a. The first type of estimates 
In the first type of estimates that we call Quantity estimates, we run three regressions with 
respectively CSR_1_0,CSR_2_0and CSR_3_0 as independent variables. 
b. The second type of estimates 
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In the second type of estimates that we call Quality estimates, we run seven regressions with 
respectively Intercation_1_0 to Interaction_7_0 as independent variables.  
Tackling the endogeneity issue 
It should be noted that the same factors (e.g. size, business sector, firm’s strategy, etc.) may 
have an impact on firm performance and the firm’s likelihood of investing in Corporate Social 
Responsibility, environmental standards, HR practices, and customer & supplier practices. 
Thus, in order to correct for possible endogeneity, we rely on the Simultaneous Equations 
Model (SEM), which considers environmental standards, HR practices, and customer & 
supplier practices, aggregation and interactions of CSR dimensions as endogenous variables.6 
This model relies on a simultaneous estimation approach in which the factors that determine 
CSR dimensions, aggregation and its interactions (a) are estimated simultaneously with those 
defining the firm’s profit (b). The two equations are jointly estimated using maximum 
likelihood. 
In the following SEM, * *1 2and  Y Y are latent variables that respectively, influence the 
probability of firms investing in different combinations of CSR dimensions and improving 
their profitability: 
 
 ∗ = 	 +  +  + ∗ = 	 +  +  +          (1) 
  
where 1  X and 2  X are here the same and  include some exogenous variables such as 
characteristics and features of the firm such as size, being a part of a holding group, market 
                                                 
6
 Let us note that in our case, the explanatory variables that are supposed to be endogenous are dummy variables 
like the environmental standards, social practices and customer & supplier practices. We use the Roodman 
(2009) cmp command in Stata in order to estimate our model. The advantage of this command is that it allows 
for different formats (e.g. binary, censored and continuous) of the dependent variables in the system of 
equations.  
23 
 
uncertainty, market conditions, export activities, R&D strategy, advertising and business 
sector. 
In our case, Y2* is fully observed, however Y1* is observed (and then written Y1) if it is higher 
than a threshold. The variable 1Z represents the vector of instrumental variables that guarantee 
the identification of the model and facilitate the estimation of correlation coefficients 
(Maddala 1983). A SEM circumvents the problem of interdependence by using instrument 
variables to obtain predicted values of endogenous variables (in our case, CSR dimensions, 
aggregation form of CSR and its intersections). Since we take 1  X and 2  X as identical, then in 
order to identify the model, we need some (at least one) additional variables  (included in 1Z ) 
that explain the probability of the firm investing in CSR or its dimensions but are not 
correlated with the error term of firm performance equation. More precisely, we include two 
variables in 1Z :  
(1) Firm’s business had been affected since 2003 by a change in regulations, standards 
(health, environment, worker rights, etc.)7. 
(2) Firm used in 2003 some workgroup tools (e.g. groupware, videoconference, etc.)8.  
 
As can be seen in the appendix, the choice of these variables is wise from a statistical 
standpoint. 
                                                 
7This variable is related to law, hence to public regulation. According to the concept of “articulated regulation”, 
there is a link between private collective self-regulation (which CSR is a part of) and public regulation (Utting 
2005). 
8
 Workgroup tools are considered as an important instrument of a firm’s social responsiveness toward employees 
(Surocca et al., 2010) and then may affect Corporate Social Responsibility. Using group work tools could help 
employees to enhance their knowledge and motivation to understand the problems, identify solutions and 
implement improved practices related to social responsibility (Hart, 1995). 
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Finally to address reverse-causality issues, given that strong profitability will allow a firm to 
invest time and effort in CSR and its dimensions, we model lagged effects by estimating the 
impact of investment in CSR in 2003 on profit in 2006.  
 
How to check the hypotheses 1A, 1B and 2? 
- In order to test the Hypothesis 1A (i.e. isolated CSR dimensions exert a positive impact on 
firm performance), we take as the reference the case where no CSR dimension is implemented 
and we look at the effect of (1) green practices only, (2) HR practices only, and (3) customer 
& supplier only, on firm’s profit. 
- In order to test the Hypothesis 1B (i.e. aggregate measure of CSR exerts a positive impact on 
firm performance), we take as the reference the case where no CSR dimension is implemented 
and we look at the effect on a firm’s profit of (1) having one CSR dimension, (2) having two 
CSR dimensions, (3) having all three CSR dimensions. 
- In order to test the Hypothesis 2 concerning complementarity and substitutability in the 
sense of Athey and Stern 19989, we look at the coefficients associated with the interaction 
variables when examining their impact on profit. For instance, Interaction5_0 presents the 
interaction between green and customer & supplier practices. Let α5 be the associated 
coefficient. If α5 > α1 + α3, where α1 and α3 are respectively the coefficient associated with 
Interaction1_0 (having only green practices) and Interaction3_0 (having only customer & 
supplier practices), then we conclude that there is a complementarity between the green and 
the customer & supplier dimensions of CSR. Otherwise there is a substitutability. 
We choose to work on sub-samples having the same reference instead of working on the 
whole sample, because in the first case, Y1 , the dependent variable in the equation (a) of 
                                                 
9We use the definition by Athey and Stern (1998), when the choice is binary and the interaction effects are fixed 
across firms. 
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model (1) is binomial (making it easier to estimate model (1) by maximum likelihood) while 
in the second case it is multinomial. 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The main results of the SEM estimations are summarized in Tables 2 and 3. Note that the full 
results (Appendix 1) also provide information about the determinants of CSR dimensions and 
firm profitability. Even though we will not discuss these results, we may conclude that they 
generally confirm the findings of previous studies (e.g. Capon et al., 1990; Waddock and 
Graves, 1997; Russo and Fouts, 1997; McWilliams and Siegel, 2000; Brammer and Milligton, 
2008). 
Table 2: Qualitative estimations 
Type of Interaction Sign  Coefficient 
One dimension 
Green practices only + 0.53*** 
HR practices only + 0.52*** 
Customer & Supplier practices only + 0.30* 
Two dimensions 
Green and HR practices + 0.59* 
Green and Customer & Supplier practices + 0.51*** 
HR and Customer & Supplier practices + 0.25** 
Three dimensions 
Green, HR, and Customer & Supplier practices + 0.43*** 
The reference is the case where no dimension is implemented. 
(*), (**), (***) indicate parameter significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively. 
(ns) indicates Non Significant. 
 
 
Table 3: Quantitative estimations 
Number of Dimensions Sign Coeffcient 
1 CSR dimension ns 0.45 
2 CSR dimensions + 0.26*** 
3 CSR dimensions + 0.43*** 
The reference is the case where no dimension is implemented. 
(*), (**), (***) indicate parameter significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively. 
(ns) indicates Non Significant. 
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Isolated Effect of CSR Dimensions 
From Table 2 we observe that compared to the case where no dimension is implemented, 
having a green practice has a positive effect on profit per employee. The findings are 
consistent with previous studies (e.g. Lo et al., 2012) showing that improvement of a firm’s 
performance is one of the main triggers of a firm’s decision to invest in environmental 
practices. Moreover, we obtain similar results concerning the effect of HR practices on a 
firm’s profitability, which confirms previous findings (e.g. Huselid, 1995). Once again, the 
customer & supplier dimension has a positive effect on a firm’s profit which is in line with 
previous findings (Yeung, 2008; Pekovic and Rolland, 2013). Therefore, we may conclude 
that our Hypothesis 1A is confirmed since green, human resources and customer & supplier 
dimensions of CSR in isolation exert a positive impact on a firm’s profit. It is worth noting 
that the customer & supplier dimension exerts a weaker effect compared to the other two 
dimensions (coefficient = 0.30; p-value<0.067) which suggests that highly demanding 
practices implemented in isolation and not as part of coherent management practices bundle 
may be less beneficial for a firm’s profit growth. In other words, the different dimensions of 
CSR influence a firm’s profitability differently, which is in the line with previous studies (e.g. 
Barcos et al., 2013; Brammer and Milligton, 2008; Mackey et al., 2007). Our results confirm 
those of Barnett and Salomon (2006) which indicate that the effects of CSR vary in their 
intensity. Therefore, using a single specific dimension of CSR when examining its 
relationship with firm performance does not show the “complete” picture in term of intensity 
of effect. In this sense, our results are also consistent with studies showing that firms with 
better ESG performance tend to face significantly lower capital constraints, and that the 
relation is primarily driven by social and environmental performance (El Ghoul et al., 2011).  
  
The CSR Dimensions are Positively Correlated but are Substitutables 
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Let us turn now to the interaction between each CSR dimension. One can note that all 
interactions are positive (Table 2). However, their levels of intensity vary according to the 
type of interaction considered. A positive interaction between some dimensions does not 
necessarily lead to a complementarity or substitutability between these dimensions. More 
precisely, when testing for complementarity and substitutability effects, we observe that all 
dimensions are substitutes to each other. Let take the example of green and customer & 
supplier dimensions. They are substitutes (in the sense of Athey and Stern 1998) because the 
coefficient associated with the pattern “green and customer & supplier practices” is 0.51, 
which is weaker than the sum of their isolated effects, which is 0.83 (the coefficient 
associated with the pattern “green practices only” is 0.53 and the coefficient associated with 
the pattern “customer & supplier practices only” is 0.30). Therefore, we confirm Hypothesis 2 
on substitutable CSR dimensions. However, there is one point of divergence. Hypothesis 2 
predicts also the complementarity effect between HR and customer & supplier dimensions, 
while the empirical results indicate a substitution effect. Thus, we may conclude that the HR 
dimension shares some common characteristics with the customer & supplier dimension, 
which induces substitution between those dimensions rather than complementarity. The 
Stakeholder theory is only partially supported here, in the sense that the primary stakeholders 
are substitutes (employees, customers & suppliers). The environment appears as a non-
primary stakeholder relatively substitutable to primary stakeholders from a CSR perspective, 
with a similar kind of result that was found in Cavaco and Crifo (2013). 
 
The Implementation of CSR Practices: a Path-dependent Process 
Let us now analyze the magnitudinal effect for moving from one configuration of 
dimension(s) to another. We ask whether a firm starting with a certain configuration can 
perform better (in terms of profit) by adding or removing some dimension(s). Only one 
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configuration fulfills this requirement: green and HR. The interpretation is that when a firm 
starts with this configuration then it is better not to move to another configuration. In all other 
configurations, firms can always improve their profits either by adding or removing some 
dimensions. So from the point of view of their effects on firm performance, the green and HR 
can be considered as “optimal”. Two remarks can be made from these results. Firstly, they 
show that substitutability does not necessarily lead to overall inefficiency. In our cases, the 
green and HR dimensions are clearly substitutes. Secondly, our results suggest that the 
implementation of CSR dimensions by firms is a path-dependent process. That is, the CSR 
configuration that is in place within firms is the result of their successive past choices of CSR 
dimensions, in particular at the starting point. In other words, most firms seem to use an 
adaptative implementation process instead of a purely rational calculus of the best 
configurations. Indeed, the “optimal” solution is not implemented by all firms.  
 
Aggregated Effect of CSR Dimensions and the Quality-Quantity Trade-off 
From Table 3, we observe that our aggregate measure of CSR, which counts quantitatively the 
number of practices adopted in terms of environmental, human resources, and customers & 
suppliers practices, affects positively and significantly firm performance when a firm 
implements at least two dimensions of CSR. The estimates clearly show that the more the 
dimensions are used by firms, the higher the effects on their economic performance. This 
suggests that a purely quantitative strategy consisting of accumulating CSR dimensions works 
and that Hypothesis 1B, indicating that an aggregate measure of CSR is positively associated 
with firm performance, is fulfilled. However the comparison of the coefficients in Table 2 and 
Table 3 suggests that a quantitative strategy is less efficient than a qualitative one. For 
instance over the seven possible qualitative policies, four provide better results than the best 
quantitative policy. The choice of interaction of CSR dimensions matter for a firm’s profit. In 
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this sense, firms that want to achieve business performance improvement through investment 
in CSR dimensions need to achieve a best “fit” between the types of CSR dimensions that 
they implement (e.g. Brammer and Pavelin, 2006). Additionally, as suggested by Mackey et 
al. (2007), Brammer and Milligton (2008) and Barcoset al. (2013), our findings confirm that 
at least some (specific) forms of CSR (in our case, for instance green and customer & 
supplier) improve firm performance more than others (in our case, for instance HR and 
customer & supplier). To conclude, the profitability of CSR investments in French firms 
seems to rely on a specific qualitative mix of different CSR dimensions rather than a pure 
quantitative approach accumulating practices without designing a consistent set of 
interactions among them.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
To date, the extensive and growing theoretical and empirical research has identified no clear 
pattern in the relationship between CSR and firm performance (Brummer, 1991; McWilliams 
and Siegel, 1997; Waddock and Graves, 1997; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). Generally, the 
literature argues that one of the main reasons for this absence of consensus is associated with 
measurement problems (e.g. Surocca et al., 2010). Given this concern, we perform, using 
secondary data, a quantity-quality trade-off analysis between the various dimensions of 
Corporate Social Responsibility in order to provide a richer conceptualization and 
understanding concerning the relationship between CSR and firm performance. Hence, using 
secondary data brings another dimension in the CSR research field and may allow for a wider 
generalization of conclusions. For this purpose, we first examine the impact of stakeholders 
CSR components separately (environmental performance, HR performance, customer & 
supplier performance), which permits to us to understand how CSR measures in isolation 
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impact on a firm’s profitability. Even though our findings indicate that different dimensions 
of CSR have significant and positive effects on firm performance, the intensity of such effects 
is not the same across different dimensions. Second, we create an aggregate measure of the 
CSR indicator based on our three CSR dimensions. We observe that the aggregate measure of 
CSR positively and significantly affects firm performance. Third, we study how the 
interactions between different CSR dimensions affect corporate performance. We show that 
all forms of CSR are associated with a positive significant coefficient. When testing for 
complementarity or substitutability of the dimensions, we observe only substitutability. In 
sum, while our findings are consistent with those supporting a positive relationship between 
CSR and firm profitability (e.g. Cochran and Wood, 1984; Turban and Greening; 1996; 
Waddock and Graves, 1997; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; Godfrey, 2004), additional 
analysis confirms McWilliams and Siegel’s argument (2000) indicating that their relationship 
is very complex. Our findings suggest two sources of complexity: (1) the CSR and firm 
performance relationship is not homogeneous in terms of intensity when examining different 
dimensions of CSR; (2) the interaction among different CSR dimensions produces different 
effects on firm performance, but only in terms of effect intensity. 
Our findings have important implications for policy-makers. They suggest that managers need 
to be careful in choosing appropriate CSR tasks since those dimensions need to be compatible 
with each other and with a firm’s overall strategy. Therefore, the question for managers is not 
simply whether to invest in social responsibility; it is rather what form of social responsibility 
is suitable for a specific firm’s strategy. Additionally, the results suggest that different forms 
of firm social orientation are not only beneficial for social improvements, but could be 
considered as a tool for firm performance improvement.  
This study has limitations that could be addressed in future work. First, our approach relies on 
the nature of the data available to measure each dimension. For instance, the environmental 
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component is captured through one variable only (unlike the HR or the customer & supplier 
components), and the governance dimension is not measured due to the lack of information. 
Second, we work on a sample of French firms, which suggests that the ability to generalize 
the results is limited since there are important international institutional differences in the 
implementation of socially responsible practices. Third, future research could test the effect of 
CSR practices on employee outcomes given that the literature covering this issue is quite 
limited for the moment. Only anecdotal evidences exists which supports the argument of 
greater employee loyalty and productivity at environmentally or socially-responsible firms. 
Finally, recent research suggests that the debate concerning CSR and firm performance should 
be taken further by including additional intermediate variables that can improve our 
understanding of the processes through which CSR influences firm outcomes (e.g. Delmas 
and Pekovic, 2013; Gallear, Ghobadian, Chen, 2012; Surroca et al., 2010). For instance, 
Surocca et al. (2010) propose a model in which firm-based intangible resources, including 
innovation, human resources, reputation, and organizational culture, are mediator variables 
between CSR and firm performance. Therefore, future research should examine indirect 
mechanisms through which CSR influences firm performance. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Table B: Simultaneous Equations Model estimates of the relation between interaction of CSR dimensions and profit 
 
 
Variables 
Green only Profit HR only Profit C&S only Profit Green 
and HR 
Profit Green 
and C&S 
Profit HR and 
C&S 
Profit All 
dimensions 
Profit 
Interactions of CSR 
dimensions 
 0.53*** 
(0.24) 
 0.52***   
(0.15) 
 
 0.30* 
(0.16) 
 0.59* 
(0.32) 
 0.51*** 
(0.19) 
 0.25*** 
(0.10) 
 0.43*** 
(0.11) 
Hard law 0.13*  0.15***     0.11***  0.25***  0.10  0.21***  0.29***  
 (0.07)  (0.04)   (0.04)  (0.11)  (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.07)  
Group tool 0.18  0.44***  0.37***  0.55***  0.68***  0.76***  1.02***  
 (0.14)  (0.07)    (0.07)  (0.15)  (0.09)  (0.06)  (0.08)  
Size 0.00*** -0.00*** 0.00***    -0.00**   0.00*** -0.00*** 0.00*** -0.00** 0.00*** -0.00*** 0.00*** -0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Holding 0.04 0.37*** 0.25***    0.33***    0.39*** 0.36*** 0.17 0.37*** 0.31*** 0.35*** 0.64*** 0.32*** 0.55*** 0.34*** 
 (0.08) (0.05) (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.04) (0.05) (0.10) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) 
Uncertainty 0.10 -0.18*** 0.02    -0.18***     0.05 -0.21*** 0.06 -0.19*** -0.04 -0.18*** 0.17*** -0.17*** 0.04 -0.16*** 
 (0.08) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.11) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) 
Market down -0.01 -0.26*** -0.05  -0.29***    -0.01 -0.24*** 0.04 -0.24*** -0.04 -0.24*** -0.05 -0.18*** -0.10 -0.25*** 
 (0.09) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.13) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) 
Growing Market -0.02 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.15***    0.20*** 0.16*** 0.19 0.14** -0.12 0.14*** 0.13** 0.21*** 0.08 0.16*** 
 (0.10) (0.05) (0.05)   (0.05)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.13) (0.06) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) 
Export 0.26 0.96*** 0.202    1.07***    0.17 0.94*** 0.67*** 1.02*** 0.22 0.94*** 0.18 1.06*** 0.41*** 0.94*** 
 (0.23) (0.17) (0.13)  (0.15)  (0.12) (0.14) (0.25) (0.17) (0.16) (0.15) (0.12) (0.12) (0.15) (0.14) 
R&D 0.07 0.12 0.27***    0.09    0.49*** 0.20*** 0.23 0.08 0.62*** 0.07 0.63*** 0.25*** 0.88*** 0.14** 
 (0.12) (0.08) (0.06)  (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.15) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Advertising 0.14* 0.17*** 0.36***    0.14***   0.46*** 0.14*** 0.57*** 0.15*** 0.249*** 0.14*** 0.87*** 0.14*** 0.72*** 0.13*** 
 (0.08) (0.04) (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.05) (0.04) (0.17) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.10) (0.04) 
 -0.25 -0.19 0.03  -0.16    -0.50*** -0.06 -0.75* -0.23* -0.77*** -0.21* -0.55*** -0.10 -0.68*** -0.14 
Consumption goods (0.21) (0.12) (.11) (0.11)  (0.10) (0.11) (0.38) (0.13) (0.20) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.17) (0.11) 
Equipment goods -0.83** -0.20* 0.06    -0.20***   0.10 -0.20*** -0.15 -0.25** 0.06 -0.21*** -0.08 -0.18** -0.30*** -0.25*** 
 (0.37) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11)  (0.09) (0.09) (0.23) (0.12) (0.13) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.13) (0.10) 
Sales 0.11 0.07 0.11  0.12    -0.37*** 0.13* 0.14 0.06 -0.33*** 0.07 -0.23*** 0.12* -0.31*** 0.09 
 (0.13) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.18) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) 
Construction -0.02 -0.43*** -0.07    -0.41***    -0.05 -0.42*** -0.22 -0.44*** -0.32** -0.43*** -0.24*** -0.34*** -0.34*** -0.41*** 
 (0.16) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08)  (0.08) (0.07) (0.25) (0.08) (0.13) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.12) (0.08) 
Finance and real estate -0.13 0.03* 0.36***    0.20*    -0.59*** 0.16* -0.34 0.04 -0.65*** 0.05 -0.42*** 0.28*** -0.92 *** 0.08 
 (0.20) (0.12) (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.11) (0.11) (0.32) (0.12) (0.19) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.20) (0.12) 
Agri-food 0.30 -0.25* 0.17  -0.32**    -0.01 -0.22* 0.02 -0.31** 0.16 -0.41*** 0.12 -0.06 0.08 -0.32*** 
 (0.18) (0.15) (0.12)  (0.13)  (0.10) (0.12) (0.27) (0.15) (0.13) (0.14) (0.10) (0.10) (0.14) (0.13) 
Service to firms -0.45*** -0.66*** 0.23***    -0.63*** -0.53*** -0.59*** -0.38* -0.67*** -1.13*** -0.67*** -0.36*** -0.63*** -0.91*** -0.66*** 
 (0.16) (0.09) (0.08)  (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.21) (0.09) (0.14) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.12) (0.08) 
Transportation -0.39** -0.63*** 0.05    -0.65***    -0.41*** -0.59*** -0.59* -0.64*** -0.63*** -0.66*** -0.40*** -0.60*** -0.74*** -0.63*** 
 (0.18) (0.10) (0.10)  (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.30) (0.10) (0.15) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.14) (0.09) 
Constant -2.06*** 
(0.14) 
0.94*** 
(0.09) 
-1.57*** 
(0.09)    
0.89***   
(0.08) 
-1.20*** 
(0.08) 
0.90*** 
(0.08) 
-3.06*** 
(0.22) 
0.97*** 
(0.08) 
-1.80*** 
(0.13) 
0.95*** 
(0.08) 
-2.09*** 
(0.10) 
0.83*** 
(0.07) 
-2.57*** 
(0.14) 
0.91*** 
(0.08) 
Observations 4,663 4,663 5,720 5,720 6,060 6,060 4,569 4,569 4,826 4,826 6,334 6,334 5,151 5,151 
(*), (**), (***) indicate parameter significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively. 
 
 
 
Appendix 1 
 
Table A: Simultaneous Equations Model estimates of the relation between aggregate 
measure of CSR dimensions and profit 
 
Variable 
One dimension 
(versus no 
dimension) 
Profit Two 
dimensions 
(versus no 
dimension) 
Profit Three 
dimensions 
(versus no 
dimension) 
Profit 
Aggregate measure of 
CSR dimensions 
 0.45 
(0.35) 
 0.26** 
(0.10) 
 0.43*** 
(0.11) 
Hard law 0.14***  0.120***  0.29***  
 (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.07)  
Group tool 0.41***  0.76***  1.025***  
 (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.08)  
Size 0.00*** -0.00*** 0.00*** -0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Holding 0.33*** 0.32*** 0.58*** 0.34*** 0.55*** 0.34*** 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) 
Uncertainty 0.04 -0.19*** 0.12*** -0.17*** 0.04 -0.16*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) 
Market down -0.04 -0.28*** -0.05 -0.18*** -0.10 -0.25*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.08) (0.05) 
Growing Market 0.18*** 0.16*** 0.09* 0.19*** 0.08 0.16*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.08) (0.05) 
Export 0.20* 1.01*** 0.19* 1.10*** 0.41*** 0.94*** 
 (0.10) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.15) (0.14) 
R&D 0.40*** 0.15* 0.63*** 0.21*** 0.88*** 0.14** 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Advertising 0.43*** 0.13** 0.749*** 0.13*** 0.72*** 0.13*** 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.10) (0.04) 
Consumption goods -0.31*** -0.01 -0.59*** -0.09 -0.64*** -0.14 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.17) (0.11) 
Equipment goods 0.03 -0.20*** -0.06 -0.21*** -0.30** -0.25*** 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.13) (0.10) 
Sales -0.17*** 0.18*** -0.22*** 0.11* -0.31*** 0.09 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) 
Construction -0.07 -0.38*** -0.26*** -0.33*** -0.34*** -0.41*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.12) (0.08) 
Finance and real estate -0.15* 0.32*** -0.47*** 0.30*** -0.92*** 0.08 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.20) (0.12) 
Agri-food 0.07 -0.19* 0.13 -0.12 0.08 -0.32** 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.14) (0.13) 
Service to firms -0.22*** -0.53*** -0.47*** -0.62*** -0.91*** -0.67*** 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.121) (0.08) 
Transportation -0.26*** -0.57*** -0.45*** -0.60*** -0.741*** -0.63*** 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.139) (0.09) 
Constant -0.90*** 0.78*** -1.74*** 0.83*** -2.573*** 0.91*** 
 (0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.07) (0.139) (0.08) 
Observations 7,433 7,433 6,719 6,719 5,151 5,151 
(*), (**), (***) indicate parameter significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively. 
 
 
 
